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production elucidate a pattern of specialization in which upper- and middle-income 
countries produce sophisticated components and lower-income countries assemble lower-
value-added final goods. There is evidence of increasing sophistication within the 
electronics sector by the Newly Industrialized Economies and to a lesser extent by 
ASEAN countries. Despite the marked increase in intra-regional trade, developing East 
Asian countries remain heavily dependent on developed-country markets. When Western 
export demand rapidly contracted during the 2008-2009 economic crisis, these 
specialization patterns led the rapid diffusion of the business cycle shock throughout the 




Keywords: Global production networks; electronics; Asian trade; business cycle 
transmission; global economic crisis 
 
JEL codes: F14, F23, F40, L63   1
Global Production Networks in Electronics and Intra-Asian Trade 
 
Byron Gangnes  
University of Hawai’i at Manoa
1  
 
Ari Van Assche 
HEC Montréal and LICOS 
1  Introduction 
The last twenty years have seen a sharp rise in intra-regional East Asian trade. In 1980, 
trade among the nine major developing East Asian (EA-9) countries represented just 21% 
of their total exports and 22% of their imports.
2 By 2004, the intra-regional export share 
had risen to 40%, and the import share to 47%. Much of the growth in intra-regional trade 
has been driven by the growth of trade in electronics, which accompanied the rise of East 
Asia as the world’s leading electronics producer. By 2004, trade in electronics 
represented $326 billion of the total intra-regional manufactured trade of $704 billion. 
The growth and evolving structure of East Asian electronics trade reflect structural 
changes in the nature of electronics production. As electronic goods have become more 
modular, and as shrinking communication and transportation costs have reduced global 
distances, flagship companies in the U.S., Japan and Europe have increasingly 
fragmented their production processes and offshored their manufacturing activities to the 
Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs). As labor costs started rising in the NIEs, firms 
have in turn offshored labor-intensive activities to less-developed East Asian countries, a 
phenomenon that has accelerated with the entry of China into global production 
networks. 
The extensive integration of East Asian countries into global production networks for 
electronics products has unambiguously facilitated regional growth. But the uneven 
development paths taken by the various countries have also raised concerns. First, many 
of the Newly Industrialized Economies fear that the rise of other developing East Asian 
countries and especially China is hollowing out their economies. The ASEAN-4 and 
China, on the other hand, are concerned that they are stuck in the low-value-added 
production activities in the global production networks. Second, with the deepening intra-
Asian economic linkages and the increased reliance on electronics exports, the region has 
become increasingly dependent on final demand originating in the developed market 
economies and thus susceptible to industry and macroeconomic cycles. 
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In this paper, we review the development of global production networks in electronics 
and East Asia’s central role. We document the impact of these developments on emerging 
patterns of trade among the region’s economies and between the region and the 
developed world. We analyze patterns of specialization both from the perspective of trade 
and also through the use of a unique database of electronics production statistics. While 
many of these issues have been discussed extensively in the literature, most existing 
studies look at overall patterns of trade. Our contribution is to focus specifically on trade 
in electronics components. And by considering data on production, we are able to shed 
clearer light on patterns of specialization that may be masked by the high volume of trade 
in intermediate components. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe how the 
fragmentation of production has contributed to the emergence of East Asia’s electronics 
sector. We document evolving patterns of specialization and trade using electronics trade 
data in Section 3. Section 4 uses data on electronics production to evaluate the 
sophistication of electronics production in the region. Section 5 looks at how the growth 
of electronics trade has affected Asia-Pacific interdependence, and investigates the effect 
of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis on trade within global production networks. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2  East Asia and the Rise of Global Production Networks in 
Electronics 
Developing East Asia (The EA-9 economies comprising the Asian NIEs, ASEAN-4 and 
China) has emerged as a dominant global electronics manufacturing base over the past 
twenty-five years.
3 As shown in Table 1, in 1985 the region was a small player, with 
national production levels of a few billion dollars or less, and with global production 
centered in the developed world. Between 1985 and 1995, the electronics sectors of many 
countries in the region experienced compound annual growth of 20–30% or more, and the 
region’s share of global electronics production reached 22%. Rapid growth has continued 
since then, and in 2005 the EA-9 garnered 43% of world electronics production.
4 
[Table 1 about here]  
The development of East Asia’s electronics industry was initiated by the decisions of 
American and Japanese electronics firms to fragment their production processes 
internationally in response to a changing technological and competitive environment 
(Dedrick & Kraemer 1998, Lowe & Kenney 1999, Borrus, Ernst & Haggard 2000).  As 
electronics design became more modular and the costs of coordinating production over 
distance declined, U.S. and Japanese firms were able to locate less sophisticated 
production in lower-cost developing Asian economies (Sturgeon, 2002; Van Assche, 
2008).  This process accelerated as competition within the industry grew.  The presence 
of foreign affiliates in Asia expanded rapidly, and production and trade relationships 
                                                             
3This section draws on the discussion in Bonham, Gangnes & Van Assche (2007). 
4Unlike production, electronics expenditure has remained concentrated in the developed 
world, with the share of electronics expenditure to GDP remaining substantially higher in 
the U.S., Japan and the E.U. than in developing East Asia.   3
developed between and among East Asian economies as well. The East Asian region 
became a key part of the emerging global electronics production networks. 
The landmark event in this process was the introduction of the IBM personal 
computer in the early 1980s, which dramatically increased the incentives for electronics 
firms to fragment the computer production process internationally (Ernst 2004).
5  Before 
the PC, electronics companies built computers with fully closed proprietary architectures.  
The closed systems implied a high cost of coordinating interoperability between 
components and induced firms to produce almost everything—semiconductors, hardware 
and operating systems—in-house and usually within one country (Dedrick & Kraemer 
1998, Chandler 2001).  The modular product architecture of the IBM PC changed all this.  
The standards of compatibility and interoperability among components of the PC were 
fixed and publicly known (Langlois & Robertson 1995).  Stages of the production 
process became separable from one another, and the costs of coordinating activities 
across the various stages fell dramatically.  It became feasible and economically 
advantageous to site each piece of the production process where it could be produced at 
lowest relative cost, prompting a gravitation of labor-intensive stages to low-wage Asian 
economies.   
The modular structure of the PC also drove fragmentation in another way. Once the 
de facto standards of interoperability and compatibility were set, barriers to entry were 
substantially reduced, and thousands of producers of IBM clones and components entered 
the market. The resulting competition drove down prices in almost all areas (Langlois & 
Robertson 1995). In order to survive in the new highly-competitive environment, 
electronics producers were compelled to reduce production costs by moving labor-
intensive production blocks to East Asia (Dedrick & Kraemer 1998).  And, over time, as 
component prices continued to fall, labor costs became a bigger share of PC production 
costs (Curry & Kenney 1999), further increasing the pressure to reduce costs through 
international fragmentation. 
East Asia became the focus for much of the electronics offshoring for several reasons. 
First, the region already had a track record in electronics production, having produced for 
the consumer electronics industry during the late 1960s (Lowe & Kenney 1999).  In 
addition, many East Asian economies were viewed as attractive because they had both an 
abundant supply of low-wage labor and a large and growing pool of high-skilled 
engineers.  Compared with many other developing regions, East Asia enjoyed a relatively 
stable political and macroeconomic environment, conducive to long-term investment 
projects and business relations (Yusuf 2001).   Economic policies became more 
supportive during the 1980s and 1990s, as East Asian countries adopted export-oriented 
growth strategies, reduced trade and investment barriers, and deregulated domestic 
economic activities such as insurance, banking and transportation.  Low trade barriers are 
particularly important for international production fragmentation, since goods may need 
to cross borders multiple occasions during the production process (Hummels, Rapoport & 
Yi 1998; Yi 2003). 
                                                             
5 Theoretical discussions of international production fragmentation include Jones & 
Kierzkowski 1990 and Jones & Kierzkowski 2001.  Related to this is the economics 
literature on vertical foreign direct investment (Helpman 1984, Helpman 1985).   4
At the same time, there have been changes in the global economic environment that 
have facilitated production fragmentation.  Global transportation costs for distant travel 
and time-sensitive goods have declined over the past several decades (Hummels 2007; 
Behar & Venables, forthcoming), benefiting the international trade of goods produced in 
internationally fragmented production processes where just-in-time linkages are 
important.  A sharp decline in air shipping costs and improved ocean freight shipping 
have reduced the cost of distant relative to proximate transport, lowering costs of trade 
between East Asia and the United States.  In addition to cheaper shipping, vastly cheaper 
communication technologies have become available, including inexpensive international 
telephone service, facsimile machines and the internet.  These have enhanced the 
coordination, management and monitoring of activities in different locations. 
The development of global production networks in electronics has proceeded in 
stages, first with the movement of labor-intensive production activities by U.S., 
European, and Japanese producers to the NIEs and ASEAN-4 countries. This can be seen 
in Table 1 in the high compound annual growth rates of these countries during the 1980s. 
As electronics producers in the NIEs gained in expertise, and as their labor costs rose, a 
second wave of offshoring occurred to lower-wage Asian countries. By the 1990s, the big 
story was the integration of China into the electronics global production networks (See, 
for example,  Amighini  2005; Gaulier, Lemoine & Unal-Kesenci 2007; and Gangnes & 
Van Assche, 2010.) In some market segments, this new round of outsourcing has been 
dramatic: by early 2004, 70% of Taiwanese notebook computers were being produced in 
China (Yang 2006). For observers in other East Asian economies, this of course raises 
questions about the impact of China’s growing presence and its implications for regional 
production and trade. 
3  Patterns of Electronics Specialization and Trade 
The growth of electronics trade in East Asia has substantially surpassed the growth of 
electronics production. As shown in Table 2, developing East Asia’s electronics exports 
expanded at a compound annual rate of 18% between 1980 and 2004. World electronics 
exports grew at a slower 12% rate, so that by 2004 the EA-9 share of world electronics 
exports had grown to 49%, from just 13% in 1980. By 1990, the region had surpassed 
both the U.S. and Japan as an electronics exporter, and by 2004 the region’s electronics 
exports at $702 billion were more than the combined total of the U.S., Japan and the 
European Union. 
[Table 2 about here]  
The very rapid growth of East Asia’s electronics trade was accompanied by a rise in 
the importance of intra-regional trade (Table 3). In 1980, only 23% of EA-9 electronics 
exports went to other EA-9 countries, and only 26% of imports came from other EA-9 
countries. By 2004, 46% of exports were intra-regional, and fully 68% of imports. The 
biggest external export market for East Asian producers continues to be the U.S., 
although both the EU and Japan have risen in relative importance. Japan plays a 
dominant role as a source of extra-regional imports, but the U.S. is also very important. 
[Table 3 about here]    5
As Asian producers have become integrated into global production networks, clear 
patterns of specialization and trade have emerged. Table 4 shows export and import 
shares both within and outside of the region. We divide electronics products into 
intermediate and final goods categories, giving us a rough indicator of which countries 
and regions specialize primarily in assembly operations and which specialize in the 
production of components.
6 Not surprisingly, the U.S. and EU-15 dominate final goods 
demand, purchasing a combined 42–50% of the final goods exports of the NIEs, 
ASEAN-4 and China. The U.S. market is particularly important for ASEAN countries 
(especially Malaysia). Japan is even more dependent on American markets, with 57% of 
its final electronics products destined for the U.S. Imports of final goods come largely 
from the NIEs and China.
7 
[Table 4 about here]  
The picture for intermediate goods looks somewhat different. The NIEs are the most 
important source of intermediate electronics imports, but they are also the leading 
destination for component exports. Japan, the U.S., China and ASEAN all export a 
substantial portion of their component production to NIEs. The NIEs in turn export 
heavily to China, as well as to other NIE countries. Hong Kong takes the largest share of 
these component exports by the NIEs, but there are significant bilateral flows in virtually 
all directions. 
These trade patterns can be explained by a familiar comparative advantage story, 
applied to the vertically-fragmented electronics industry. Labor-abundant China is 
heavily specialized in the assembly of final products, which are exported to the U.S. and 
E.U. ASEAN countries also are significant final goods exporters. The production of 
intermediate goods—which we will see below is typically a more sophisticated activity 
than assembly—is dominated by the NIEs, economies which have considerable physical 
and human capital. The high-wage developed economies play only a limited role in 
                                                             
6We construct nine subcategories based on three and four digit SITC Rev. 2 data. Four of 
the nine are judged to be predominantly “Intermediate Goods” and the remaining five 
categories are primarily “Final Products”. “Intermediate Goods” comprise SITC 759 
(Parts of and accessories suitable for office machines and automatic data processing 
machines & units), 764.9 (Parts of apparatus of division 76–), 772 (Elect. app. such as 
switches, relays, fuses,..., referred to as passive components) and 776 (thermionic, cold & 
photo-cathode valves, tubes,..., referred to as active components). “Final Products” 
include 751 (office machines), 752 (automatic data processing machines & units), 761 
(television receivers), 764.1 (elect. line telephonic & telegraphic apparatus), and 764.2 
(microphones, loudspeakers, amplifiers). Trade data for two three-digit electronics 
categories was excluded from our analysis, because no data for the category was provided 
in the Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer (763, television and sound recorders) or 
the available data was not sufficiently detailed to permit subdivision between 
intermediate and final goods (762 radio-broadcast receivers).  
7The particularly large figures for trade between the NIEs and China reflect in part trade 
between China and Hong Kong. Roughly half of China’s imports of final electronics 
come from Hong Kong and about two-thirds of the NIEs imports from China represent 
Hong Kong demand.   6
electronics production, specializing instead in product design and marketing, activities 
that do not show up in merchandise trade figures. 
A clearer view of the intensity of electronics industry specialization can be seen using 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices. Measures of export RCA are often used 
to help assess a country’s export specialization. A value that exceeds unity implies that 
the country has a greater than average share of electronics exports in that category.
8 Ng & 
Yeats (2001) argue that a similar import RCA index can be used as a reliable predictor of 
specialization in final product assembly. A country that specializes in the export of final 
assembly is likely to import more than proportionately parts and components in that 
sector. It follows that countries with above average import shares for components in a 
sector are relatively heavily specialized in assembly operation. Export RCA indices for 
East Asian electronics are given in Table 5; import RCAs are given in Table 6.  
[Table 5 about here]  
[Table 6 about here]  
The RCA indices confirm the very different roles played by the ASEAN-4 countries 
(and China), the NIEs, and the U.S. and Japan. For the ASEAN-4 countries, export RCA 
indices for final goods categories average above 1, indicating that for these low-to-middle 
income countries final goods make up a larger-than-average share of their electronics 
exports. Their export RCA indices for intermediate goods average below one. Import 
RCAs for ASEAN-4 show the opposite pattern: high import intensity in intermediate 
goods and lower-than-average imports of final goods. Note that China appears quite 
similar to the ASEAN-4 economies, although even more specialized as a producer of 
final goods. This pattern is consistent with the notion that less-developed East Asian 
economies specialize in the labor-intensive assembly of final electronics products. 
On the other end of the spectrum are the U.S. and Japan, which display high final 
good import intensities and intermediate good export intensities. These rich-country 
economies are specialized in the production of components, particularly semiconductors, 
and serve as dominant markets for final goods. 
Consistent with the results of the regional trade flow analysis, the NIEs appear to 
occupy a pivotal middle ground. These economies exhibit high intermediate good 
intensity on both the import and export side. This pattern is consistent with the NIEs 
                                                             
8The export RCA index is calculated as the ratio of two ratios, the ratio of exports for 
each subsection of electronics in an economy to that economy’s total electronics exports, 
relative to the ratio of world exports for each corresponding section to world total 
electronics exports. The index reveals the pattern of export specialization for an economy 
relative to worldwide patterns. The greater a sector’s RCA, the more an economy 
specializes in that sector’s exports relative to world specialization patterns. The import 
RCA index is defined analogously. While such indices by definition measure the degree 
of specialization of exports in product categories, the term “revealed comparative 
advantage” is an unfortunate misnomer. Because trade may be highly distorted by trade 
barriers and implicit or explicit domestic taxes and subsidies, such measures may 
“reveal” little about the actual comparative advantage of countries.   7
intermediate role within electronics production value chains. They source relatively 
unsophisticated parts from lower-wage Asian economies that they use to produce more 
sophisticated electronics components. They then supply these components to China and 
other lower-wage Asian economies for final assembly.
9 
4  Product Sophistication and Upgrading 
A key research question of interest to many policy makers is which countries are 
responsible for the high-value-added production activities in global value chains and 
which countries are stuck with the less profitable low-value-added activities. A number 
of studies by Lall (2006), Rodrik (2006) and Hausmann, Hwang & Rodrik (2007) have 
recently tried to gain insights into this issue by estimating the revealed sophistication of a 
country’s export composition. The starting point of these studies is that a country’s 
production activities are more sophisticated if its export composition more closely 
resembles that of high income countries. The rationale behind this is that richer countries 
generally have characteristics that provide a comparative advantage in more-advanced 
industries. These characteristics may include high capital abundance, the embodiment of 
higher-level technology and better institutions. As developing countries improve these 
characteristics, they will gradually create comparative advantages in the same industries 
as the richer countries. 
As we have argued in Van Assche & Gangnes (2010), there is a key shortcoming of 
using export data to estimate a country’s position on the technological ladder. Export data 
are collected and reported as gross flows rather than as value added created in the 
exporting country. In a world with international production fragmentation and 
intermediate good trade, a country’s exports therefore do not necessarily reflect the 
embodied technology and relative endowments that have gone into the country’s 
domestic production activities, but may simply reflect the technology and factors of the 
countries from which it imports intermediate goods. This may be a particularly large 
problem in the East Asian region where intermediate good trade plays such a large role in 
trade patterns. 
A more appropriate tool to estimate a country’s degree of sophistication is production 
data. In this section, we estimate the degree of sophistication of the East Asian countries’ 
electronics industries by making use of a unique data set of world electronics production 
                                                             
9There are interesting exceptions to these general observations for specific subcategories, 
presumably reflecting specialization patterns across market segments and idiosyncratic 
factors. For example, Malaysia and the Philippines have high export RCAs in active 
components (semiconductors), but these are likely lower value added memory chips and 
standardized components. The U.S. has relatively high export intensity in the final good 
categories of office machines, telephone/telegraph and sound equipment, probably 
catering to more-sophisticated market segments. The ASEAN-4 and China export 
relatively few televisions—due to the large role of Mexico and Eastern European 
countries in the mainstream market—while Japan exports more televisions than expected, 
presumably higher-end models. This represents a limitation of the fairly-aggregate 
product classification scheme we have used, dictated by data available in the Statistics 
Canada data set.   8
compiled by Reed Electronics Research.
10 The Reed Electronics Production Data Set 
(REP) measures a country’s domestic production by electronics subcategories for fifty-
one countries. The coverage and degree of disaggregation in the REP varies between 
countries, but we have been able to extract a consistent panel for nine electronics 
subcategories from 1992 to 2005 that is in line with our definition of electronics above 
(See Table 7 for the list of product subcategories). 
[Table 7 about here]  
To analyze the relative degree of sophistication of the East Asian countries’ 
electronics sectors, we use the same methodology as Hausmann, Hwang & Rodrik 
(2007), albeit with production data instead of trade data. In a first step, we estimate the 
level of technological sophistication of an electronics subcategory as the weighted-
average income of its producers. Let xi,c denote the production value of electronics 
subcategory i in country c,   equal country c’s total electronics production 
value and Yc represent country c’s per-capita GDP in current prices. Then the level of 
product sophistication S for good i is given by  
  . (1) 
Once the sophistication index has been estimated for all electronics subcategories i, 
one can then in a second step calculate a country’s technology index CTI as the weighted 
average of the sophistication levels of the electronics subcategories that it produces:  
 
  , (2) 
where a product’s weight   equals the share of good i in country c’s total electronics 
output:  
  . 
In Table 8, we present the sophistication indices S
i for the various electronics 
subcategories in 1992 and 2004 respectively. For ease of analysis, the degree of 
sophistication of each electronics subcategory is reported relative to that of the most 
sophisticated subcategory, Radio Communications & Radar. For the same purpose, we 
have grouped the nine electronics subcategories into the three more general categories 
Communications, Components and Computers, Audio & Video (CAV). 
                                                             
10Production data could be subject to the same difficulty in identifying value added as 
opposed to the value of gross sales, which could in some cases, “amount to little more 
than assembly of imported piece-parts and sub-assemblies.” The problem is likely smaller 
than for export values, however, since goods are counted in production only when “value 
is added in the assembly process and the finished article can be classified under a 
different SIC Standard Industrial Classification) from those of its components.” (Reed 
Electronics Research 2007)    9
[Table 8 about here]  
We can use Table 8 to make a couple of observations. First, it is striking that within 
the electronics industry there is a wide variation in sophistication. Video equipment and 
audio equipment, for example, have degrees of sophistication that are just 39 percent and 
53 percent of that of radio communications & radar. Second, if we compare the degree 
of sophistication of the three major categories, we obtain the result that Communications 
is more sophisticated than Components and CAV in that order. It is noteworthy, however, 
that the relative sophistication of CAV has dropped significantly during the twelve year 
period (see Figure 1). In 1992, its relative degree of sophistication was 0.84, while in 
2004 it had declined to 0.75. This drop is not due merely to the rapid rise of China’s EDP 
production. Rather, it represents a more general trend of production specialization in CAV 
by developing countries including China, the ASEAN-4 countries, Mexico and a number 
of Eastern European countries. As mentioned above, one of the main drivers of this trend 
is likely the large-scale offshoring of EDP assembly plants by multinational firms to 
developing countries made possible by changes in technology and the economic 
environment that facilitated the vertical fragmentation of computer production. 
[Figure 1 about here]  
With this relative sophistication index in mind, we can analyze the degree of 
sophistication of East Asian countries’ electronics production activities. In Table 9, we 
depict the production intensity indices for the various East Asian countries in the three 
electronics categories. A production intensity index is the same as an RCA index, except 
that it uses production data instead of trade data. In other words, a number larger than one 
implies that a country produces relatively more of that electronics category than the rest 
of East Asia. A number smaller than one suggests that a country is less specialized than 
the rest of Asia in that category.
11 
[Table 9 about here]  
The 2004 production intensity indices confirm that, within the East Asian region, the 
richer economies generally specialize in the production of the more sophisticated 
electronics products. Japan and the NIEs are specialized in the high sophistication 
category Communications.
12 Japan, the NIEs and the ASEAN-4 are specialized in the 
medium sophistication category Components and the ASEAN-4 and China are 
specialized in the low sophistication category CAV. 
Between 1992 and 2004, Japan and the NIEs have generally upgraded their 
production composition by reducing their specialization in CAV and sustaining or 
increasing their specialization in Communications and Components. The ASEAN-4 has 
primarily increased its specialization in Components at the cost of Communications. 
China, finally, has increased its concentration in CAV. 
                                                             
11We present the more disaggregated set of production intensity indices that we use in the 
calculation of the CTI index in the appendix. 
12These results differ for the four NIE countries. Singapore, for example, has been least 
specialized in Communications of all East Asian countries.  10 
In a final step, we can use equation 2 to calculate the country technology indices 
(CTI) for the 51 countries included in the REP data set. In Figures 2 and 3, we show the 
scatter plot of CTI against per-capita GDP for the East Asian countries in 1992 and 2004. 
A number of observations stand out from the graphs. First, with the exception of South 
Korea in 1992 and the Philippines in 2004, it is generally the case that the CTI of the 
more developed East Asian economies Japan and the NIEs exceeds that of the less 
developed East Asian economies in the ASEAN-4 and China. The reason behind South 
Korea’s low CTI in 1992 is their high specialization in the low sophistication categories 
of audio and video equipment. The reason behind the Philippines’ high CTI in 2004 is 
their high specialization in active components. Second, South Korea is the country that 
has improved its ranking most significantly between 1992 and 2004. It has moved up 
from 7th to 1st place due to its heightened specialization in radio communications and 
radar, and despecialization in audio and video equipment. The largest loser has been 
Hong Kong (from 2nd to 6th) due to its despecialization in radio communications and 
radar. Finally, it is noteworthy that China’s CTI is comparable to that of the ASEAN-4 
countries Malaysia and Thailand. Contrary to more aggregate trade-based results, China’s 
electronics production does not appear to be more sophisticated than one would expect 
given its level of economic development. 
[Figure 2 about here]  
[Figure 3 about here]  
Our analysis confirms that the richer economies in the East Asian region specialize in 
the production of the more sophisticated electronics products. It also suggests that the rise 
of China is not necessarily threatening the other East Asian countries’ economies, but that 
Japan, the NIEs and to a lesser extent the ASEAN-4 have been able to upgrade to more 
sophisticated production activities over time. These more sophisticated production 
activities include components, but also some higher-value-added final goods such as 
radio communications and radar. 
5  Electronics Trade and Asia-Pacific Interdependence 
The buildup of East Asia’s electronics industry has been an important component of the 
region’s rapid growth over the past two decades. However, the dramatic rise in 
electronics specialization has also raised the concern of increased vulnerability of these 
economies to industry cycles and to broader business cycle fluctuations in the developed 
world. In his book, End of the Line, Barry Lynn gave a nice example to demonstrate this 
vulnerability. On September 21, 1999 an earthquake slammed through Taiwan and shut 
down its main electronics hub Hsinchu Science Park for a week (Lynn 2005). The one-
week shutdown affected companies around East Asia and the world that relied on 
Taiwanese components and cut world output of electronics in October by 7 percent below 
predictions. 
The electronics industry is prone to more severe cyclical fluctuations than regular 
business cycles, arising from the uneven pace of technical progress, changes in leading 
products, and demand conditions in consuming countries (Kumakura 2005, Chow &  11 
Choy 2006, Engel & Wang 2008). According to data compiled by Kumakura (2005), new 
orders for electronics typically swing from positive annual growth rates of about 30% to 
contractions of 5–10% in the space of a single year; swings in semiconductor sales are 
even more pronounced. The 2001 industry slump saw both semiconductor sales and 
electronics orders fall by about 30% in one year.
13 Engel and Wang (2008) show that U.S. 
durable goods imports such as electronics are more sensitive to business cycles than 
nondurable goods imports. 
These cycles have notable effects on aggregate export performance of East Asian 
economies. We can use electronics trade data to gauge the extent of national exposure to 
electronics industry cycles. Table 10 shows the shares of electronics in overall 
manufactured exports for each of the EA-9 countries, the U.S., EU-15 and Japan. The 
electronics export share for the East Asian region is roughly twice as large as that of the 
world as a whole, and it has risen significantly since 1980. In all countries but Indonesia, 
electronics represent more than 30% of total manufactured exports, with export shares of 
about 60% for Singapore and Malaysia. Export shares for final electronics products are 
2–5 times larger than for the U.S., EU-15 and Japan. 
[Table 10 about here]  
 
In addition to vulnerability to cycles within the electronics industry, high dependence 
on large developed-country markets—particularly in the United States—represent 
another source of vulnerability. Table 11 shows export volumes relative to GDP. Figures 
are reported for total electronic exports, exports of electronics final goods, and final 
goods exports to the U.S. Not only are electronics exports large relative to GDP, but a 
number of countries in East Asia have a significant economic dependence on the U.S. 
economy through their electronics final goods exports to the U.S. market. In the case of 
Singapore and Malaysia this dependence appears to be very large. (However, their high 
volume of component imports suggests trade data for these countries may be misleading, 
as we discuss below.)  Dependence on the U.S. market remains high despite the growth 
of intra-Asian trade.
14 
[Table 11 about here]  
                                                             
13We are aware of only a small number of formal studies of the role of the electronics 
industry in international business cycles. Abeysinghe (2000) analyzes the global 
electronics cycle and its impact on Singapore. Chou, Gau & Liang (2007) study supply 
and demand factors in the linkage between US and Taiwanese electronics industries. The 
importance of electronics industry cycles in Asia has been studied as a proximate cause in 
the development and transmission of the 1997 Asian Financial crisis; Daraisami (2004) 
looks at the case of Malaysia. Kumakura (2005) find that adjusting for electronics 
industry cycles can change empirical conclusions about the impact of China on the trade 
of other East Asian economies and on the role of exchange rate fluctuations in East Asian 
trade. 
14This point has been made in a more general context by Athukorala & Yamashita (2006) 
and Abeysinghe & Forbes (2001).  12 
One has to be careful, however, in using export share data to measure a country’s 
degree of vulnerability. Overall shares of electronics exports may exaggerate the extent 
of economic vulnerability because of the preponderance of trade in intermediate goods. 
As we have noted above, a considerable and rising proportion of electronics trade 
involves cross-hauling of parts and components between countries, sometimes with 
limited value added created before re-export. An extreme case of this is China, where 
“processing trade”—the assembly of imported components for exports—represent more 
than half of all exports and 90% of electronics exports (Ma, Van Assche & Hong, 2009; 
Ma & Van Assche, 2009). Domestic value added in Chinese processing trade remains 
low, accounting for less than 15% for electronic and communication equipment 
(Koopman, Wang and Wei, 2008), although these margins have increased in recent years 
(Cui & Syed 2007). If value added in an economy’s electronics sector is limited, then the 
aggregate economic impact of a drop-off in export growth will be smaller than it might 
appear. There will be an accompanying drop in the country’s import demand for 
components, thus leading to a business cycle pass-through effect. 
At the same time, countries specialized in components exports can also face 
significant downward economic impacts from, say, a downturn in the American market 
even if they export relatively small amounts of final goods to the U.S. The downturn in 
demand would reduce electronics production through reduced demand for component 
exports to third country producers of final goods bound for the American market.
15 
Ma & Van Assche (2009, forthcoming) have used data on China’s processing trade to 
provide preliminary evidence of business cycle pass-through effects within global 
production networks in the context of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis.  Data on 
China’s processing trade regime are particularly useful for this purpose since, by its 
nature, firms under this regime are granted duty exemptions on imported raw materials 
and other inputs as long as they are used solely for export purposes. This allows one to 
investigate how a change in demand for Chinese processing exports affects China’s 
demand for processing imports.  Such analysis cannot be conducted with regular trade 
data since imports are not necessarily used solely for export purposes. 
As it is shown in Table 12, the effect of the economic crisis on China’s processing 
trade has been large. In the first quarter of 2009, demand for China’s processing exports 
experienced a stunning contraction of 23.7% compared to a year earlier. Interestingly, the 
negative export demand shock seems to have been amplified as it moved upstream from 
processing exports to processing imports, with China’s processing imports dropping an 
even larger 36.2%. This amplification effect is not only observed in aggregate trade, but 
also across industries. This is in line with the bullwhip effect that is often witnessed in 
global supply chains (Lee, Padmanabhan and Wang, 1997; Cachon, Randall and Schmidt, 
2007). When a drop in final demand reduces downstream activities, a firm’s first reaction 
is to run down its inventories. Thus a slowdown in downstream activities transforms itself 
into an amplified reduction in the demand for inputs that are located upstream.  
  
[Table 12 about here] 
 
                                                             
15As the Taiwan earthquake example illustrates, electronics industry vulnerabilities also 
exist on the supply side. Supply factors were seen to be important components of 
international linkages between the U.S. and Taiwan by Chou, Gau & Liang (2007).  13 
The business-cycle pass-through effect in China’s processing trade has hit most 
severely China’s imports from countries that more intensively supply China with its 
processing inputs, that is, its East Asian neighbors. As shown in Figure 4, with the 
exception of Vietnam and Indonesia, more than 40% of China’s imports from its major 
East Asian trading partners were processing imports in 2006, which is a significantly 
higher share than for countries outside of East Asia. These East Asian countries have 
witnessed the largest import decline during the recent global economic crisis. Compared 
to the previous year, China’s imports from its major East Asian trading partners all 
declined between 25% and 61% in the first quarter of 2009.  In contrast, China’s imports 
from its major non-Asian trading partners dropped less than 20%.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
These empirical findings suggest that business cycle shocks are rapidly transmitted 
internationally through global production networks (Burstein, Kurz and Tesar, 2008). 
This business cycle pass-through effect can help explain the large drop in intra-Asian 
trade that was registered during the crisis period, as well as the big decline in world trade 
(Tanaka, 2009; Yi, 2009; Escaith, 2009). More research, however, is needed on this topic. 
The complex nature of trade linkages, and the endogeneity of price and output responses, 
means that such casual inspection of trade data is unlikely to give a complete picture of 
the dependence of East Asian economies on the electronics industry or on large rich-
country consumer markets.  What is needed is systematic modeling of electronics 
production and trade within the context of a international macroeconomic model.  There 
appears to be little work yet of this kind.
16 
6  Conclusions 
Global production networks are at the heart of the East Asian electronics industry. Over 
the past several decades, multinational electronics firms have sliced up their value chains 
and have dispersed their production activities across the globe, with the lion’s share in 
East Asia. As we have seen, this large-scale reorganization of international production 
has not only altered the patterns of trade across the region, but has also affected many 
East Asian countries’ growth paths. In this paper, we have emphasized the point that 
comparative advantage continues to explain trade patterns, but within the context of 
globally-fragmented value chains. 
At the same time, there are a number of new research questions that arise when 
thinking about global production networks. First, there is a need to analyze in more detail 
the mechanisms through which countries are able to upgrade into higher-value-added 
activities within a global production network. How is value distributed throughout a 
network, and what drives the process of technological upgrading by countries?  In 
addition, we need to examine more carefully the ways in which these global production 
networks affect the vulnerability of countries.  
The global economic crisis has brought a new question to the fore: the sustainability 
of global production networks in the post-crisis era. Some observers predict that recent 
                                                             
16Abeysinghe & Forbes (2001) use trade patterns to inform a structural VAR model of 
output interactions among these countries and regions.  14 
macro-economic events and technological advances threaten to reverse this trend of 
international production fragmentation, thus making global production networks more 
local. First, the era of cheap and plentiful oil seems to have drawn to a close, thus leading 
to increases in transportation costs (Rubin, 2009). Second, the global economic crisis of 
2008-2009 has put pressure on many governments to adopt protectionist measures that 
privilege domestic over foreign production and that raise trade and investment barriers 
(Baldwin and Evenett, 2009). Finally, the adoption of just-in-time production techniques 
(associated with reductions in communication costs) has enticed firms to source their 
time-sensitive components closer to home (Evans and Harrigan, 2005; Harrigan and 
Venables, 2006). Since international production fragmentation is considered especially 
sensitive to changes in such transaction costs (Yi, 2003), these trend reversals could 
entice flagship electronics firms that are supplying Western markets to on a large scale 
rethink their global supply chains and abandon far away production for closer locations. 
If these predictions play out, this could have profound impacts on intra-Asian trade 
patterns. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
Country Technology Index Versus GDP Per Capita, 2004 
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Figure 4 
Intensity of China’s processing imports (2007) versus severity of China’s imports 
contraction (08Q1-09Q1), by country of origin. 
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Table 1                   
Growth of Electronics Production, 1985-2005 
 
 
Electronics Production   
Share of world 
electronics production 
   (US$  Millions)    Compound Annual 
Growth 
  (%) 
Country  1985  1995  2005   1985-1995 1995-2005    1995 2005 
East Asia     -  199 310  538 902     -  10     22 43 
   NIEs    -  126 280  193 469    -  4    14 16 
      Hong Kong    2 647  7 498  3 036    11  -9    1 0 
      Korea    5 571  47 747  105 429    24  8    5 9 
      Singapore    3 907  39 091  47 251    26  2    4 4 
      Taiwan    -  31 944  37 752    -  2    3 3 
   ASEAN4    3 695  48 145  94 963    29  7    5 8 
      Indonesia    545  4 451  10 639    23  9    0 1 
      Malaysia    1 791  27 569  47 731    31  6    3 4 
      Philippines    781  4 109  13 620    18  13    0 1 
      Thailand    578  12 016  22 972    35  7    1 2 
   China    -  24 885  250 471    -  26    3 20 
United States     146 941  235 359  221 360    5  -1    26 18 
EU 15    -  168 082  172 224    -  0    18 14 
Japan     79 155  244 687  177 845    12  -3    27 14 
Total Market    -  916 132  1 238 894    -  3    100 100 
Source: Reed Electronics Research, Yearbook of World Electronics Data. Adapted from Gangnes and Van Assche (2010). 
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Table 2               
Growth of Electronics Exports, 1980-2004          
      Value    
Compound 
Annual    
Share of world 
electronics 
   (US$ Millions)    Growth    exports (%) 
Country   1980  2004   1980-2004    1980  2004 
East Asia (Incl.)*     12 395  701 962     18     13  49 
East Asia (Excl.)    9 608  376 325    17    10  26 
   NIEs    10 472  385 334    16    11  27 
      Hong Kong    2 571  101 455    17    3  7 
      Korea    1 860  91 412    18    2  6 
      Singapore    3 018  94 294    15    3  7 
      Taiwan    3 023  98 173    16    3  7 
   ASEAN4    1 838  119 989    19    2  8 
      Indonesia    103  7 771    20    0  1 
      Malaysia    1 325  65 218    18    1  5 
      Philippines    72  15 823    25    0  1 
      Thailand    339  31 176    21    0  2 
   China    84 196  639    38    0  14 
United States     17 889  142 720    9    19  10 
EU 15 (Excl.)    14 990  134 801    10    16  9 
Japan     19 795  125 927    8    21  9 
Total Market     96 453  1 429 699     12     100  100 
Source: Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer. Adapted from Gangnes and Van Assche (2010)   
“Incl.” indicates that trade flow includes intra-regional; “Excl.” indicates intra-regional trade is excluded. 
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Table 3                   
Origins and Destinations of Electronics Trade  
                    
  East Asia    United States    EU-15    Japan 
Country 1980  2004    1980  2004    1980  2004    1980  2004 
Exporting Region                                  
   East Asia (Incl)  22.5  46.4    40.7 18.9    20.3  16.2    4.5  8.5 
   East Asia (Excl)  …  …    52.4 35.3    26.2  30.2    5.8  15.8 
   United States  11.0  31.9    …  …    43.8  17.6    6.7  5.7 
   EU-15 (Excl)  10.3  22.9    11.2  12.9    …  …    2.3  2.3 
   Japan  20.8  54.4    26.1  18.3    26.6  18.1    …  … 
                      
Importing Region                     
   East Asis (Incl)  26.2  68.1    18.5  9.5    14.5  6.5    38.6  14.3 
   East Asia (Excl)  …  …    25.0 29.9    19.7  20.3    52.3  45.0 
   United States  37.0  58.6    …  …    12.4  7.7    37.9  10.2 
   EU15 (Excl)  14.4  55.6    44.9 12.3    …  …    30.2  11.2 
   Japan  24.7  82.9     52.8  11.3     15.0  4.4     …  … 
Source: Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer.         
*“Incl.” indicates that intra-regional trade is included; “Excl.” indicates intra-regional trade is excluded.    
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Table 4        
Intra-regional and Inter-regional Electronics Trade (2004) 
Country NIEs  ASEAN4  China  US  EU  (Excl)  Japan 
  Final Goods 
Export shares        
   NIEs  12.3  6.2  20.2  20.1  22.1  6.9 
   ASEAN4  18.3  4.7  9.7  32.6  15.1  9.1 
   China  23.4  4.0  …  27.6  22.4  11.8 
   US  9.1  2.8  4.1  …  25.7  6.9 
   EU15 (Excl)  6.8  2.5  3.1  15.7  …  2.8 
   Japan  15.2  5.6  10.4  31.2  25.8  … 
        
Import Shares        
   NIEs  23.5  15.2  40.1  7.6  4.4  7.5 
   ASEAN4  39.6  13.2  22.8  7.9  5.3  9.2 
   China  66.4  13.9  …  5.9  3.4  8.8 
   US  21.3  15.0  26.2  …  5.5  8.5 
   EU15 (Excl)  27.3  8.1  24.9  14.0  …  8.2 
   Japan  26.9  15.4  41.0  11.7  3.6  … 
        
        
  Intermediate Goods 
Export shares        
      NIEs  22.7 10.2 28.9 12.3 10.9  6.5 
      ASEAN4  31.2  7.3 11.6 14.8 15.6 11.2 
   China  40.0  4.7  …  19.8  15.8  9.7 
   US  20.9  15.6  5.4  …  12.9  4.9 
   EU15 (Excl)  11.9  8.1  7.5  11.7  …  2.1 
      Japan  32.6 11.8 18.0 13.8 15.5  … 
        
Import Shares        
      NIEs  33.6 11.3 19.1 10.5  6.4 17.5 
   ASEAN4  38.7  6.8  5.8  20.1  11.1  16.2 
   China  66.6  6.6  …  4.2  6.3  15.0 
   US  30.1  8.9  15.5  …  10.3  12.2 
   EU15 (Excl)  27.8  9.7  12.9  11.1  …  14.2 
   Japan  43.1  18.3  20.8  11.2  5.1  … 
Source: Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer.          
*“Excl.” indicates intra-regional trade is excluded.       
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Table 5                         
Export RCAs                                     
  Final Goods    Intermediate Goods 
SITC Rev. 2  751  752  761  7641  7642 
Final 






















  NIEs  1.15  0.66  0.56  0.54  0.68  0.80   0.81  0.95  0.61  1.49  1.14 
         Hong Kong  1.53  0.36  0.28  1.01 1.34  0.80    2.03  1.30 0.89  1.00 1.11 
         Korea Rp  1.01  0.62  1.12  0.27 0.62  0.77    0.23  1.67 0.31  1.09 1.17 
         Singapore  0.98  0.91  0.17  0.29 0.35  0.81    0.53  0.47 0.45  1.97 1.14 
         Taiwan  1.06  0.78  0.71  0.57 0.36  0.84    0.35  0.39 0.77  1.91 1.13 
  ASEAN4  1.05  1.22  0.98  1.04  0.82 1.12   0.49  0.57  0.59  1.29  0.90 
         Indonesia  0.96  1.23  1.19  0.47 2.90  1.11    1.55  1.33 0.91  0.42 0.86 
         Malaysia  1.04  1.04  0.94  0.74 0.87  1.01    0.24  0.52 0.68  1.47 0.97 
         Philippines  1.22  1.44  0.02  0.21 0.22  1.13    1.10  0.35 0.13  1.69 0.93 
         Thailand  1.00  1.48  1.51  2.22 0.51  1.36    0.43  0.61 0.54  0.94 0.74 
  China  1.08  1.75  0.85  1.26  1.83  1.41   0.58  1.26  0.49  0.34  0.72 
  USA  1.08  0.92  0.32  1.29  1.17  0.95   0.74  0.63  1.08  1.39  1.04 
  Japan  1.01  0.37  1.15  0.15  0.32  0.63   1.57  1.13  1.37  1.32  1.26 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer.                   
Note: For more complete category descriptions, see footnote 3.                  27 
Table 6                      
Import RCAs                                     
  Final Goods    Intermediate Goods 
SITC Rev. 2  751  752  761  7641  7642 
Final 





















components   
  NIEs  1.02  0.53  0.31  0.53  0.81  0.67   0.70  0.75  0.80  1.81  1.23 
         Hong Kong  1.12  0.67  0.37  0.67 1.06  0.80    0.85  1.00 0.81  1.40 1.15 
         Korea Rp  0.52  0.48  0.23  0.42 0.74  0.47    0.67  0.65 0.87  2.17 1.37 
         Singapore  1.35  0.42  0.37  0.46 0.75  0.73    0.64  0.61 0.69  1.88 1.19 
         Taiwan  0.78  0.38  0.13  0.42 0.34  0.49    0.41  0.42 0.85  2.36 1.36 
  ASEAN4  1.13  0.27  0.10  0.45  0.49 0.55   0.63  0.51  0.93  2.16  1.32 
         Indonesia  0.38  0.49  0.56  2.79 1.66  0.65    0.62  2.09 1.68  0.37 1.24 
         Malaysia  1.12  0.32  0.06  0.37 0.51  0.57    0.58  0.46 0.91  2.20 1.31 
         Philippines  0.93  0.11  0.07  0.26 0.21  0.38    0.56  0.27 0.58  2.75 1.43 
         Thailand  1.48  0.30  0.19  0.55 0.59  0.70    0.84  0.71 1.26  1.65 1.22 
  China  1.11  0.48  0.05  0.27  0.37  0.63   1.30  0.86  1.11  1.67  1.27 
  USA  1.01  1.37  1.94  1.18  1.35  1.29   0.87  1.12  0.81  0.51  0.79 
  Japan  0.98  1.29  0.70  0.97  1.32  1.11   1.45  0.75  0.61  1.15  0.92 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer.                   
Note: For more complete category descriptions, see footnote 3.                 
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Table 7   
Categories of Electronics Production 
  
Category  Type of Products 
Electronic data processing  Computers,  peripherals 
  
Office equipment   Photocopiers, electronic calculators 
  
Radio communications and radar   Mobile radio telephones, pagers 
  
Telecommunications   Telephones, fax, answering machines 
  
Video equipment   Television, video camera, DVD player 
  
Audio equipment   Portable audio, car audio, CD player 
  
Active components   Integrated circuits, diodes, transistors 
  
Passive components   Printed circuit boards, relays, switches 
  
Other components   Microphones, loudspeakers, amplifiers 
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Table 8        
Product sophistication indices                 
Share of world 
electronics 
production   
Relative 
sophistication 
Category  1992  2004    1992  2004 
Communications  26.2 26.6     1.00 0.97 
  Radio Communications &  Radar  14.5  19.6    1.00  1.00 
  Telecommunications   11.7  7.0    0.98  0.87 
           
Components  29.5 32.4   0.86 0.88 
  Passive components  8.5  7.1    0.95  0.93 
  Other components  6.0  4.4    0.95  0.92 
  Active components  15.0  20.8    0.78  0.85 
           
Computers, Audio and video  44.3 41.0   0.85 0.72 
  Electronic Data Processing   29.8  30.7    0.95  0.81 
  Office equipment  2.7  1.0    0.85  0.74 
  Audio equipment  3.7  2.2    0.57  0.53 
  Video equipment  8.0  7.1    0.51  0.39 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Reed Electronics Research. 
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Table 9           
Production Intensity Indices                   
 Communications    Components   Computers,  Audio&Video 
  1992  2004  1992  2004   1992 2004 
Japan  1.15  1.12    0.96  1.29     0.99  0.70 
            
NIEs  0.72  1.10  1.07  1.27   1.02  0.74 
  South Korea  0.84  1.66  1.35  1.12   0.78  0.63 
  Taiwan  0.84  1.03  1.01  1.49   1.03  0.57 
  Singapore  0.30  0.25  0.83  1.27   1.30  1.08 
  Hong Kong  1.17  1.05  0.88  0.95   1.04  1.02 
            
ASEAN-4  1.02  0.43  1.02  1.27   0.98  1.03 
  Philippines  1.64  0.44  1.58  1.55   0.40  0.77 
  Malaysia  0.90  0.44  0.96  1.31   0.90  0.97 
  Thailand   0.90  0.50  0.64  1.00   1.30  1.21 
  Indonesia  1.56  0.44  0.63  0.94   1.13  1.28 
            
China  1.21  0.98    0.81  0.44     1.09  1.48 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Reed Electronics Research 
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Table 10           
Electronics Export Shares                 
  
Electronics Exports as Share of 
Manufacturing Exports    
Electr. Final Good Exports as 
Share of Manufacturing 
Exports    
Country  1980  2004     1980  2004    
East Asia (Incl.)*  14.4  39.2    2.8  15.9   
East Asia (Excl.)*  14.1  34.6    2.9  17.5   
   NIEs  16.1  42.6    3.6  13.5   
      Hong Kong  13.2  38.3    3.4  12.1   
      Korea Rp.  11.1  35.6    4.1  10.8   
      Singapore  29.6  57.7    4.9  18.4   
      Taiwan  16.2  44.8    2.7  14.8   
   ASEAN4  17.7  42.9    0.2  19.0   
      Indonesia  6.9  18.9    0.1  8.3   
      Malaysia  34.8  60.7    0.3  24.2   
      Philippines  3.0  39.4    0.1  17.5   
      Thailand  12.6  34.4    0.4  18.5   
   China  0.8  32.3    0.1  18.1   
United States  10.6  19.0    6.2  7.1   
EU-15 (Excl.)*  6.0  11.0    2.1  3.3   
Japan   14.7  21.0    4.3  5.3   
Total Market  8.0  18.9     3.2  7.5   
Source: Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer.   
“Incl.” indicates that trade flow includes intra-regional; “Excl.” indicates intra-regional trade is excluded. 
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Table 11            
Electronics Trade Dependence 
  
Electronics Exports 
as Share of GDP    
Electr. Final Good 
Exports as Share of 
GDP    
Electr. Final Good 
Exports to U.S. as 
Share of GDP 
Country  1980 2004      1980 2004      1980 2004 
East Asia (Incl.)*  2.0  18.3   0.4  7.4    0.2  1.9 
   NIEs  7.3  30.0    1.6  9.5    0.7  1.9 
      Hong Kong  9.0  61.2    2.3  19.3    1.2  2.3 
      Korea Rp.  3.0  13.4    1.1  4.1    0.5  0.8 
      Singapore  25.8  87.8    4.3  28.0    0.9  7.2 
      Taiwan  7.3  29.6    1.2  9.8    0.5  2.3 
   ASEAN4  1.0  19.2    0.0  8.5    0.0  2.8 
      Indonesia  0.1  3.0    0.0  1.3    0.0  0.2 
      Malaysia  5.4  55.1    0.0  21.9    0.0  9.5 
      Philippines  0.2  18.2    0.0  8.1    0.0  1.3 
      Thailand  1.0  19.3    0.0  10.4    0.0  2.8 
   China  0.0  10.2    0.0  5.7    0.0  1.6 
Japan   1.8  2.7     0.5  0.7     0.1  0.2 
Source: Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer; IMF and World Bank for GDP. 
“Incl.” indicates that intra-regional trade is included.             
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Table 12 
China’s Processing Trade during the 2008-2009 Economic Crisis 
Processing exports     Processing  imports     
  (US$ billion)   
Processing 
exports growth 




   08Q1  09Q1     08Q1/09Q1     08Q1  09Q1     08Q1/09Q1 
High technology  78.27  57.25    -26.9    45.9  29.08    -36.6 
   Aircraft  0.21  0.23    8.6    0.11  0.09    -17.8 
   Pharmaceuticals  0.37  0.36    -3.3    0.08  0.09    24 
   Office and computing machinery 30.66  23.8    -22.4    3.59 2.43   -32.5 
   Radio, TV and comm. Equipment  38.5 27.82    -27.7    29.71 20.25   -31.9 
   Medical, precision and optical ins.  8.54 5.05    -40.9    12.41 6.22   -49.8 
Medium-high technology  34  24.85    -26.9    13.58  9.79    -27.9 
   Electrical machinery  10.52  7.43   -29.4   6.27  4.34    -30.7 
   Motor vehicles  3.37  1.37    -59.4    0.26  0.17    -35 
   Chemicals  2.47  2.01   -18.4   2.1 1.41    -32.9 
   Other transport equipment  0.87  0.79   -9.5   0.07  0.06    -13.1 
   Machinery and equipment  16.77  13.26    -21    4.89  3.81    -22 
Medium-low technology  12.68  12.04    -5.1    10.12  5.69    -43.8 
   Shipbuilding and repairing  3.36  5.3    57.5    0.01  0.04    377.6 
   Rubber and plastic products     4.57 3.59    -21.5    1.59  1.09   -31.5 
   Petroleum products  0.05  0.04   -14.7   0.04  0.18    395.9 
   Non-metallic mineral products  0.71  0.49    -31.1    0.66  0.37    -44.5 
   Metal products  3.98  2.62    -34.3    7.82  4.01    -48.7 
Low technology  22.68  19.38    -14.6   6.58  4.69   -28.7 
   Manufacturing  8.17  6.79   -16.9   0.73  0.52    -27.7 
   Paper and paper products  1.38  0.98    -29    1.28  0.72    -44 
   Printing and publishing  0.32  0.32   -1.3   0.06  0.05    -13.3 
   Food, beverages and tobacco  1.32 1.35    2.5    0.71  0.5    -29.5 
   Textiles, apparel and leather  11.49  9.94    -13.5    3.8  2.9    -23.8 
Other 4.55  2.63    -42.3    11.76  6.85    -41.8 
Total  152.18  116.15     -23.7     87.94  56.1     -36.2 
Source: Ma and Van Assche (forthcoming).                
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Table A              
Production intensity indices for detailed electronics subcategories 
   COM  TEL  PAS  OTH  ACT  EDP  OFF  AUD  VID 
2004                  
Japan  1.16 0.97 1.51  0.74 1.34 0.59 1.23 0.56  1.16 
Korea Rp.  2.00 0.31 0.51  0.66 1.37 0.67 0.53 0.31  0.59 
Taiwan  0.98 1.20 1.66  0.54 1.63 0.58 0.06 0.27  0.69 
Singapore  0.23 0.33 0.60  1.08 1.49 1.37 0.63 0.80  0.06 
Hong Kong  0.58 2.88 2.45  1.80 0.37 0.70 6.20 6.26  0.00 
Philippines  0.53 0.11 0.97  0.41 1.94 0.94 0.66 0.51  0.15 
Malaysia  0.36 0.72 0.86  1.26 1.45 0.91 0.28 1.89  0.94 
Thailand  0.23 1.54 0.87  1.29 0.99 1.21 0.76 1.28  1.20 
Indonesia  0.40 0.61 1.34  1.55 0.71 0.88 1.23 1.88  2.72 
China  0.85 1.49 0.74  1.36 0.18 1.52 1.36 1.56  1.27 
                  
1992                  
 COM  TEL  PAS  OTH  ACT  EDP  OFF  AUD  VID   
Japan  1.12 1.18 1.07  0.88 0.95 1.01 1.18 0.81  0.98 
Korea Rp.  0.63 1.00 0.65  1.34 1.64 0.49 0.39 1.11  1.48 
Taiwan  0.71 0.94 1.62  1.07 0.74 1.47 0.42 0.56  0.27 
Singapore  0.44 0.19 0.47  0.66 1.05 1.71 0.64 0.91  0.58 
Hong Kong  1.42 0.98 1.14  2.06 0.35 1.17 1.67 1.82  0.07 
Philippines  2.49 0.97 0.68  0.36 2.41 0.36 0.24 0.49  0.50 
Malaysia  0.84 0.95 0.65  0.54 1.62 0.46 0.31 2.52  1.22 
Thailand  0.73 1.03 0.70  0.44 0.69 1.33 0.99 0.23  1.93 
Indonesia  1.54 1.58 0.35  1.38 0.48 0.48 0.96 1.63  2.66 
China  1.09 1.31 1.19  1.28 0.47 0.48 1.49 2.64  1.71 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Reed Electronics Research. 
 
 